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ABSTRACT
We present HORNET, a system that enables high-speed end-to-end
anonymous channels by leveraging next generation network archi-
tectures. HORNET is designed as a low-latency onion routing sys-
tem that operates at the network layer thus enabling a wide range
of applications. Our system uses only symmetric cryptography
for data forwarding yet requires no per-flow state on intermediate
nodes. This design enables HORNET nodes to process anonymous
traffic at over 93 Gb/s. HORNET can also scale as required, adding
minimal processing overhead per additional anonymous channel.
We discuss design and implementation details, as well as a perfor-
mance and security evaluation.
1. INTRODUCTION
Recent revelations about global-scale pervasive surveillance pro-
grams have demonstrated that the privacy of Internet users world-
wide is at risk. These revelations suggest massive amounts of pri-
vate data, including web browsing activities, location information,
and personal communications are being harvested in bulk by do-
mestic and foreign intelligence agencies. The surveillance-prone
design of the Internet accompanied by the decreasing cost of data
storage have enabled mass-surveillance, through indiscriminate data
collection and storage [12, 8].
To protect against these and other surveillance threats, several
anonymity protocols, tools, and architectures have been proposed.
Among the most secure schemes for anonymous communications
are mix networks [28, 36, 20, 21], which are useful for cases where
high-latency asynchronous messaging can be tolerated. Onion rout-
ing networks (most notably Tor [23]), offer a balance between se-
curity and performance, enabling low-latency anonymous commu-
nication suitable for typical Internet activities (e.g., web browsing,
instant messaging, etc.). Tor is the system of choice for over 2 mil-
lion daily users [13], but its design as an overlay network suffers
from performance and scalability issues: as more clients use Tor,
more relays must be added to the network. Additionally, Tor’s de-
sign requires per-connection state to be maintained by intermediate
nodes, limiting the total number of concurrent anonymous connec-
tions that can take place simultaneously.
The scalability and performance limitations of anonymous net-
works have been partially addressed by building protocols into the
network layer rather than implementing them as overlays. Among
these high-performing schemes are LAP [29] and Dovetail [42],
which offer network-level low-latency anonymous communication
on next-generation network architectures. The high performance
of both schemes, however, results in significantly degraded secu-
rity guarantees; endpoints can be de-anonymized if the adversary
has global data collection abilities, and payload protection relies
on upper layer protocols which increases complexity.
In this paper, we present HORNET (High-speed Onion Routing
at the NETwork layer), a highly-scalable anonymity system that
leverages next-generation Internet architecture design. HORNET
offers payload protection by default, and can defend against some
global observation attacks. HORNET is designed to be highly ef-
ficient: instead of keeping state at each relay, connection state (in-
cluding, e.g., onion layer decryption keys) is carried within packet
headers, allowing intermediate nodes to quickly forward traffic for
large numbers of clients.
While this paper proposes and evaluates a concrete ano-nymity
system, a secondary goal herein is to broadly re-think the design
of low-latency anonymity systems by envisioning networks where
anonymous communication is offered as an in-network service to
all users. For example, what performance trade-offs exist between
keeping anonymous connection state at relays and carrying state in
packets? If routers perform anonymity-specific tasks, how can we
ensure that these operations do not impact the processing of regu-
lar network traffic, including in adversarial circumstances? And if
the network architecture should provide some support for anony-
mous communication, what should that support be? Throughout
the paper we consider these issues in the design of our own system,
and provide intuition for the requirements of other network-level
anonymity systems.
Specifically, our contributions are the following:
• We design and implement HORNET, an anonymity system
that uses source-selected paths and shared keys between end-
points and routers to support onion routing. Unlike other
onion routing implementations, HORNET routers do not keep
per-flow state or perform computationally expensive opera-
tions for data forwarding, allowing the system to scale as new
clients are added.
• We analyze the security of our system, showing that it can
defend against passive attacks, and certain types of active
attacks. Our system provides stronger security guarantees
than existing network-level anonymity systems.
• We evaluate the performance of our system, showing that
anonymous data processing speed is comparable to that of
LAP and Dovetail (up to 93.5 Gb/s on a 120 Gb/s software
router). Each HORNET node can process traffic for a practi-
cally unlimited number of sources.
2. PROBLEM DEFINITION
We aim to design a network level anonymity system to frustrate
adversaries with mass surveillance capabilities. Specifically, an ad-
versary observing traffic traversing our system should be unable to
link (at large scale) pairs of hosts communicating over the network.
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This property is known as end-to-end unlinkability [39].
We define sender anonymity as a communication scenario where
unlinkability is guaranteed for the source, but the destination’s lo-
cation is public (e.g., web sites for The Guardian or Der Spiegel).
We define sender-receiver anonymity as a scenario where the un-
linkability guarantee is extended to the destination (e.g., a hid-
den service that wishes to conceal its location). Sender-receiver
anonymity therefore offers protection for both ends, implying sender
anonymity. Depending on users’ needs, HORNET can support ei-
ther sender anonymity or sender-receiver anonymity.
Since our scheme operates at the network layer, network location
is the only identity feature we aim to conceal. Exposure of network
location or user identity at upper layers (e.g., through TCP sessions,
login credentials, or browser cookies) is out of scope for this work.
2.1 Network Model
We consider that provisioning anonymous communication be-
tween end users is a principal task of the network infrastructure.
The network’s anonymity-related infrastructures, primarily routers,
assist end users in establishing temporary anonymous sessions for
anonymous data transmission.
We assume that the network layer is operated by a set of nodes
(e.g., ASes). Each node cooperates with sources to establish anony-
mous sessions to the intended destinations, and processes anony-
mous traffic within the created sessions. We require that routing
state allows each node to determine only the next hop. In particu-
lar, the destination is only revealed to the last node and no others.
This property can be satisfied by IP Segment Routing [10], Future
Internet Architectures (FIAs) like NIRA [46] and SCION [48], or
Pathlets [26].
We assume the underlying network architecture provides a mech-
anism for a source to obtain a path to a destination. This path is the
combination of routing state of all nodes between the source and the
intended destination. Additionally, we assume that the same mech-
anism allows the source to fetch the public keys and certificates1 of
on-path nodes. The source retrieves the above information anony-
mously using one of two methods: 1) using unprotected queries
to retrieve the necessary information to reach a public path lookup
server and then creating an anonymous session to the server; or 2)
using any form of Private Information Retrieval (PIR), as was re-
cently proposed for Tor [35]. In Section 7.1, we briefly sketch how
to obtain this information anonymously in selected FIAs. While a
general solution represents an important avenue for future work, it
remains outside of our present scope.
We assume that end hosts and on-path nodes have public keys
accessible and verifiable by all entities. End hosts can retrieve the
public keys of other end hosts through an out-of-band channel (e.g.,
websites) and verify them following a scheme like HIP [37], in
which the end hosts can publish hashes of their public keys as their
service names. Public keys of on-path nodes are managed through
a public-key infrastructure (PKI). For example, the source node can
leverage Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [16] to verify
the public keys of on-path nodes.
2.2 Threat Model
We consider an adversary attempting to conduct mass surveil-
lance. Specifically, the adversary collects and maintains a list of
“selectors” (e.g., targets’ network locations, or higher-level proto-
col identifiers), which help the adversary trawl intercepted traffic
and extract parts of it for more expensive targeted analysis [8]. An
1Depending on the underlying PKI scheme, the source might need
to fetch a chain of certificates leading to a trusted anchor to verify
each node’s public key.
anonymity system should provide no way for such an adversary to
leverage bulk access to communications to select traffic that be-
longs to the targets. Thus an adversary will have to collect and an-
alyze all traffic and cannot reliably select traffic specific to targets
unless it has access to the physical links next to the targets.
We consider an adversary that is able to compromise a fraction
of nodes on the path between source and destination. For sender
anonymity, the adversary can also compromise the destination. For
sender-receiver anonymity, the adversary can compromise at most
one of the two end hosts.
By compromising a node, the adversary learns all keys and set-
tings, observes all traffic that traverses the compromised node, and
is able to control how the nodes behave including redirecting traffic,
fabricating, replaying, and modifying packets. However, like other
low-latency schemes, we do not solve confirmation attacks based
on the analysis of flow dynamics [43, 31, 38] and active packet tag-
ging [40]. Resisting such attacks using dynamic link padding [45]
is no more difficult than in onion routing, although equally expen-
sive.
2.3 Desired Properties
HORNET is designed to achieve the following anonymity and
security properties:
1. Path information integrity and secrecy. An adversary should
not be able modify a packet header to change path without
detection. The adversary should not learn forwarding infor-
mation of uncompromised nodes, node’s positions, or the to-
tal number of hops on a path.
2. No cross-link identification. An adversary that can eaves-
drop on multiple links in the network cannot correlate two or
more packets on those links by observing the bit patterns in
the packet headers or payloads.
3. Session unlinkability. An adversary cannot link packets
from different sessions, even between the same set of sources
and destinations.
4. Payload secrecy and end-to-end integrity. Without com-
promising end hosts, an adversary cannot learn any informa-
tion from the data payload except for its length and timing
among sequences of packets.
3. HORNET OVERVIEW
The basic design objectives for HORNET are scalability and effi-
ciency. To enable Internet-scale anonymous communication, HOR-
NET intermediate nodes must avoid keeping per-session state (e.g.,
cryptographic keys and routing information). Instead, session state
is offloaded to end hosts, who then embed this state into packets
such that each intermediate node can extract its own state as part of
the packet forwarding process.
Offloading the per-session state presents two challenges. First,
nodes need to prevent their offloaded state from leaking informa-
tion (e.g., the session’s cryptographic keys). To address this, each
HORNET node maintains a local secret to encrypt the exported
per-session state. We call this encrypted state a Forwarding Seg-
ment (FS). The FS allows its creating node to dynamically retrieve
the embedded information (i.e., next hop, shared key, session expi-
ration time), while hiding this information from unauthorized third
parties.
The second challenge in offloading the per-session state is to
combine this state (i.e., the FSes) in a packet in such a way that each
node is able to retrieve its own FS, but no information is leaked
about the network location of the end hosts, the path length, or a
specific node’s position on the path. Learning any of this informa-
tion could assist in de-anonymization attacks (see Section 5.5). To
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address this challenge, the source constructs an anonymous header
(AHDR) by combining multiple FSes, and prepends this header to
each packet in the session. An AHDR grants each node on the
path access to the FS it created, without divulging any informa-
tion about the path except for a node’s previous and next nodes
(see Section 4.4.1).
For efficient packet processing, each HORNET node performs
one Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange operation once per session
during setup. For all data packets within the session, HORNET
nodes use only symmetric cryptography to retrieve their state, pro-
cess the AHDR and onion-decrypt (or encrypt) the payload. To re-
duce setup delay, HORNET uses only two setup packets within a
single round trip between the source and the destination. Therefore,
session setup only incursO(n) propagation delay in comparison to
O(n2) by the iterative method used in Tor (where n is the number
of anonymity nodes traversed on the path). While for Tor the de-
fault value of n is 3, for HORNET n might be as large as 14 (and
4.1 in the average case [7]), which emphasizes the need to optimize
setup propagation delay in our protocol.
3.1 Sender Anonymity
Anonymous sessions between a source and destination require
the source to establish state between itself and every node on the
path. The state will be carried in subsequent data packets, enabling
intermediate nodes to retrieve their corresponding state and forward
the packet to the next hop. We now describe how the state is col-
lected without compromising the sender’s anonymity, and how this
state is used to forward data packets.
Setup Phase. To establish an anonymous session between a source
S and a public destination D, S uses a single round of Sphinx [21],
a provably secure onion routing protocol (an overview of Sphinx is
given in Section 4.3.1). This round consists of two Sphinx packets
(one for the forward path and one for the backward path) each of
which will anonymously establish shared symmetric keys between
S and every node on that path. For HORNET, we extend the Sphinx
protocol to additionally anonymously collect the forwarding seg-
ments (FSes) for each node. Our modified Sphinx protocol protects
the secrecy and integrity of these FSes, and does not reveal topol-
ogy information to any node on the path. We note that using Sphinx
alone for data forwarding would result in low throughput due to
prohibitively expensive per-hop asymmetric cryptographic opera-
tions. Therefore, we use Sphinx only for session setup packets,
which are amortized over the subsequent data transmission pack-
ets. We explain the details of the setup phase in Section 4.3.
Data Transmission Phase. Having collected the FSes, the source
is now able to construct a forward AHDR and a backward AHDR
for the forward and backward paths, respectively. AHDRs carry the
FSes which contain all state necessary for nodes to process and
forward packets to the next hop. When sending a data packet, the
source onion-encrypts the data payload using the session’s shared
symmetric keys, and prepends the AHDR. Each node then retrieves
its FS from the AHDR, onion-decrypts the packet and forwards it to
the next hop, until it reaches the destination. The destination uses
the backward AHDR (received in the first data packet2) to send data
back to S, with the only difference being that the payload is en-
crypted (rather than decrypted) at each hop. We present the details
of the data transmission phase in Section 4.4.
3.2 Sender-Receiver Anonymity
Sender-receiver anonymity, where neither S nor D know each
other’s location (e.g., a hidden service), presents a new challenge:
2If the first packet is lost the source can simply resends the back-
ward AHDR using a new data packet (see Section 4.4).
since S does not know D’s location (and vice versa), S cannot
retrieve a path to D, precluding the establishment of state between
S and nodes on the path to D as described in Section 3.1.
A common approach to this problem (as used by Tor, LAP, and
Dovetail) is for the destination to advertise a path (or similar) back
to itself through a known, public rendezvous point (RP). Sources
establish anonymous sessions to the RP, who in turn forwards traffic
to the destination while keeping S and D’s location hidden from
each other. This solution would also work for HORNET. However,
it requires the RP to maintain per-session state between sources and
destinations, which increases complexity, bounds the number of
receivers, and introduces a state exhaustion denial of service attack
vector.
Nested a-headers. Our proposal for sender-receiver anony-mity
requires no state to be kept at the RP by nesting the AHDRs from
the source to the rendezvous and from the rendezvous to the desti-
nation. Briefly, to establish a HORNET session between S and D
keeping both parties hidden from each other,D selects a public ren-
dezvous point R and completes a HORNET session setup between
D and R. D publishes AHDRR→D to a public directory. Note that
this AHDR leaks no information about D’s location and can only be
used to send data to D through R within a specific time window.
When S wants to send traffic to D, S retrieves (from a public
directory) AHDRR→D . S then establishes a HORNET session be-
tween S and R and constructs a nested AHDR with AHDRR→D
inside AHDRS→R. S includes AHDRR→S in the data payload to
D, allowing D to create a return path to S.
One of the advantages of our scheme is that any node on the net-
work can serve as a rendezvous point. In fact, multiple points can
be selected and advertised, allowing the source to pick the RP clos-
est to it. Moreover, once a HORNET session has been established,
S and D can negotiate a better (closer) RP (e.g., using private set
intersection [25]). A disadvantage of the nested AHDR technique is
that it doubles the size of the header.
For space reasons, the formal protocol details and evaluation sec-
tions focus on sender anonymity only. Details of sender-receiver
anonymity can be found in the full paper [5].
3.3 Packet Structure
HORNET uses two types of packets: setup packets and data
packets (see Figure 1). Both types of packets begin with a common
header which describes the packet type, the length of the longest
path that the session supports, and a type-specific field. For ses-
sion setup packets, the type-specific field contains a value EXP
which indicates the intended expiration time of the session. For
data packets, the specific value is a random nonce generated by the
sender used by intermediate nodes to process the data packet.
Session setup packets include a nested Sphinx packet and an FS
payload. Data packets carry an AHDR and an onion-encrypted data
payload. We explain each field in detail in Section 4.
4. FORMAL PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
We now describe the details of our protocol, focusing on sender
anonymity. We first list the information required by the source to
start an anonymous communication (Section 4.2), and then present
the specification of the setup phase (Section 4.3) and of the data
transmission phase (Section 4.4).
4.1 Notation
Let k be the security parameter used in the protocol. For evalua-
tion purposes we consider k= 128. G is a prime order cyclic group
of order q (q ∼ 22k), which satisfies the Decisional Diffie-Hellman
Assumption. G∗ is the set of non-identity elements in G and g is a
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HORNET Session Setup Packet
hopstype
HORNET Data Packet
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Sphinx Header
Sphinx Payload
FS Payload
AHDR
Data Payload
nonceEXP
Figure 1: HORNET packet formats.
generator of G.
Let r be the maximum length of a path, i.e., the maximum num-
ber of nodes on a path, including the destination. We denote the
length of an FS as lFS and the size of an AHDR block, containing
an FS and a MAC of size k, as c= lFS +k.
HORNET uses the following cryptographic primitives:
• MAC : {0,1}k×{0,1}∗→{0,1}k : Message Authentication Code
(MAC) function.
• PRG0,PRG1 : {0,1}k→{0,1}r(c+k); PRG2 : {0,1}k→{0,1}rc :
Three cryptographic pseudo-random generators.
• PRP : {0,1}k ×{0,1}a →{0,1}a : A pseudo-random permuta-
tion, implementable as a block cipher. The value of a will be
clear from the context.
• ENC : {0,1}k × {0,1}k × {0,1}mk → {0,1}mk : Encryption
function, with the second parameter being the Initialization Vec-
tor (IV) (e.g., Stream cipher in counter mode). m is a variable
integer parameter.
• DEC : {0,1}k × {0,1}k × {0,1}mk → {0,1}mk : Decryption
function to reverse ENC.
• hop : G
∗ → {0,1}k : a family of hash functions used to key op,
with op ∈ {MAC,PRG0,PRG1,PRP,ENC,DEC}.
We denote by RAND(l) a function that generates a new uniformly
random string of length l.
Furthermore, we define the notation for bit strings. 0l stands for
a string of zeros of length l. |x| is the length of the bit string x.
x[a...b] represents a substring of x from bit a to bit b, with sub-
index a starting from 0; x[a...end] indicates the substring of x from
bit s till the end. ε is the empty string. x‖y is the concatenation of
string x and string y.
In the following protocol description, we consider a source S
communicating with a destinationD using forward path pf travers-
ing nf0 ,n
f
1 , . . . ,n
f
lf−1 and backward path p
b traversing nb0,nb1, . . . ,nblb−1,
with lf , lb ≤ r, where nf0 and n
b
lb−1 are the nodes closest to the
source. Without loss of generality, we let the last node on the for-
ward path nf
lf−1 = D and refer to the destination by these two
notations interchangeably. In general we use dir ∈ {f,b} as super-
scripts to distinguish between notation referring to the forward and
backward path, respectively. Finally, to avoid redundancy, we use
{symdiri } to denote {symdiri |0 ≤ i ≤ ldir − 1}, where sym can
be any symbol.
4.2 Initialization
Suppose that a source S wishes to establish an anonymous ses-
sion with a public destination D. First, S anonymously obtains
(from the underlying network) paths in both directions: a forward
path pf = {Rf0 ,R
f
1 , · · · ,R
f
lf−1} and a backward path p
b= {Rb0,R
b
1, · · · ,R
f
lb−1}.
Rdiri denotes the routing information needed by the node ndiri to
forward a packet. S also anonymously retrieves and verifies a set of
public keys gxndiri for the node ndiri on path pdir (see Section 2.1).
Note that gxD is also included in the above set (as nf
lf−1 = D).
Finally, S generates a random DH key pair for the session: xS
and gxS . The per-session public key gxS is used by the source to
create shared symmetric keys with nodes on the paths later in the
setup phase. S locally stores
{
(xS ,g
xS ) ,
{
g
x
ndir
i
}
,pdir
}
, and
uses these values for the setup phase.
4.3 Setup Phase
As discussed in Section 3, in the setup phase, HORNET uses
two Sphinx packets, which we denote by P➊ and P➋, to traverse
all nodes on both forward and backward paths and establish per-
session state with every intermediate node, without revealing S’s
network location. For S to collect the generated per-session state
from each node, both Sphinx packets contain an empty FS payload
into which each intermediate node can insert its FS, but is not able
to learn anything about, or modify, previously inserted FSes.
4.3.1 Sphinx Overview
Sphinx [21] is a provably-secure onion routing protocol. Each
Sphinx packet allows a source node to establish a set of symmet-
ric keys, one for each node on the path through which packets are
routed. These keys enable each node to check the header’s in-
tegrity, onion-decrypt the data payload, and retrieve the informa-
tion to route the packet. Processing Sphinx packets involves ex-
pensive asymmetric cryptographic operations, thus Sphinx alone is
not suitable to support high speed anonymous communication.
Sphinx Packets. A Sphinx packet is composed of a Sphinx header
SHDR and a Sphinx payload SP. The SHDR contains a group ele-
ment yidir that is re-randomized at each hop. Each yidir is used
as S’s ephemeral public key in a DH key exchange with node ndiri .
From this DH exchange node ndiri derives a shared symmetric key
sndiri
, which it uses to process the rest of the SHDR and mutate
the yidir . The rest of the SHDR is an onion-encrypted data struc-
ture, with each layer containing the routing information to decide
the next node to forward the packet and a per-hop MAC to pro-
tect the header’s integrity. The Sphinx payload SP allows end hosts
to send confidential content to each other. Each intermediate node
processes SP by using a pseudo-random permutation.
Sphinx Core Functions. We abstract the Sphinx protocol into the
following six functions:
• GEN_SPHX_HDR. The source nodes uses this function to gen-
erate two Sphinx headers, SHDRf and SHDRb, for the forward
and backward path, respectively. It also outputs a series of DH
public-private key pairs
{(
xi
dir,yi
dir
)} (ephemeral keys of the
source), and the symmetric keys {sndiri }, each established with
the corresponding node’s public key g
x
ndir
i .
• GEN_SPHX_PL_SEND. The function allows the source to gener-
ate an onion-encrypted payload SPf encapsulating confidential
data to send to the destination.
• UNWRAP_SPHX_PL_SEND. The function removes the last en-
cryption layer added by GEN_SPHX_PL_SEND, and allows the
destination to decrypt the SPf .
• GEN_SPHX_PL_RECV. The function enables the destination to
cryptographically wrap a data payload into SPb before sending it
to the source.
• UNWRAP_SPHX_PL_RECV. The function allows the source to
recover the plaintext of the payload that the destination sent.
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• PROC_SPHX_PKT. Intermediate nodes use this function to pro-
cess a Sphinx packet, and establish symmetric keys shared with
the source. The function takes as inputs the packet (SHDR,SP),
and the node’s DH public key gxndiri . The function outputs the
processed Sphinx packet (SHDR′,SP′) and the established sym-
metric key sndiri .
4.3.2 Forwarding Segment
We extend Sphinx to allow each node to create an FS and add it
to the FS payload. An FS contains a node’s per-session state, which
consists of a secret key s shared with the source, a routing segment
R, and the session’s expiration time EXP. To protect these contents,
the FS is encrypted with a PRP keyed by a secret value SV known
only by the node that creates the FS. A node seals and unseals its
state using two opposite functions: FS_CREATE and FS_OPEN. We
introduce only the form of FS_CREATE as follows:
FS = PRP(hPRP(SV );{s‖R‖ EXP}) (1)
4.3.3 FS Payload
At the end of each HORNET setup packet is a data structure
we call FS payload (see Figure 1). The FS payload is an onion-
encrypted construction that allows intermediate nodes to add their
FSes as onion-layers.
Processing the FS payload leaks no information about the path’s
length or about an intermediate node’s position on the path. All
FS payloads are padded to a fixed length, which is kept constant
by dropping the right number of trailing bits of the FS payload
before an FS is added to the front. Moreover, new FSes are always
added to the beginning of the FS payload, eliminating the need for
intermediate nodes to know their positions in order to process FS
payloads.
An FS payload also provides both secrecy and integrity for the
FSes it contains. Each node re-encrypts the FS payload after in-
serting a new FS and computes a MAC over the resulting structure.
Only the source, with symmetric keys shared with each node on a
path, can retrieve all the FSes from the FS payload and verify their
integrity.
Functions. There are three core functions for the FS payload:
INIT_FS_PAYLOAD, ADD_FS, and RETRIEVE_FSES.
INIT_FS_PAYLOAD. A node initializes a FS payload by using a
pseudo-random generator keyed with a symmetric key s to gener-
ates rd random bits:
PFS = PRG1(hPRG1(s))[0...rd−1] (2)
where d is the size of a basic block of the FS payload (cf. Line 2 in
Algorithm 2).
ADD_FS. Each intermediate node uses ADD_FS to insert its FS
and other meta-data MD into the payload, as shown in Algorithm 1.
First, the trailing d bits of the current FS payload, which are padding
bits containing no information about previously added FSes, are
dropped, and then the FS and MD are prepended to the shortened
FS payload. The result is encrypted using a stream cipher (Line 3)
and MACed (Line 5). Note that no node-position information is re-
quired in ADD_FS, and verifying that the length of the FS payload
remains unchanged is straight-forward.
RETRIEVE_FSES. The source uses this function to recover all
FSes {FSi} and MDs {MDi} inserted into an FS payload PFS .
RETRIEVE_FSES starts by recomputing the discarded trailing bits
(Line 4) and obtaining a complete payload Pfull. Afterwards, the
source retrieves the FSes and MDs from Pfull in the reverse order
in which they were added by ADD_FS (see lines 7 and 10).
4.3.4 Setup Phase Protocol Description
Algorithm 1 Adding FS into FS payload.
1: procedure ADD_FS
Input: s, FS , MD, Pin
Output: Pout
2: d← |FS|+ |MD|+k
3: Ptmp←
{
FS ‖MD ‖Pin [d..(r−1)d]
}
⊕PRG0(hPRG0(s))[k..end]
4: α←MAC(hMAC(s);Ptmp)
5: Pout ← α‖Ptmp
6: end procedure
Algorithm 2 Retrieve FSes from FS payload
1: procedure RETRIEVE_FSES
Input: PFS , s, {si}
Output: {FSi}, MDi
2: d← lFS+ |MD|+k
3: Pinit ← INIT_FS_PAYLOAD(s)
4: ψ← Pinit [(r−l)d..rd−1]
⊕PRG0(hPRG0(s0))[(r−l+1)d..end] ‖0d
⊕PRG0(hPRG0(s1))[(r−l+2)d..end] ‖02d
· · ·
⊕PRG0(hPRG0(sl−2))[(r−1)d..end] ‖0(l−1)d
5: Pfull = PFS ‖ψ
6: for i← (l−1), . . . ,0 do
7: check Pfull [0..k−1] =
MAC(hMAC(si);Pfull [k..rd−1])
8: Pfull ← Pfull⊕ (PRG0(hPRG0(si))‖0(i+1)d)
9: FS i ← Pfull [k..k+lFS−1]
10: MDi← Pfull [k+lFS..d−1]
11:
12: Pfull ← Pfull [d..end]
13: end for
14: end procedure
Source Processing. With the input
I =
{
(xS ,g
xS ) ,
{
g
x
ndir
i
}
,pdir
}
the source node S bootstraps a session setup in 5 steps:
1. S selects the intended expiration time EXP for the session and
specifies it in the common header CHDR.
2. S generates the send and the reply Sphinx headers by:
{SHDRf ,SHDRb}= GEN_SPHX_HDR(I,CHDR) (3)
The common header CHDR (see Figure 1) is passed to the func-
tion to extend the per-hop integrity protection of Sphinx over
it. GEN_SPHX_HDR also produces a series of keys: symmetric
keys shared with each node on both paths {sndiri }, and the DH
key pairs {(xdiri ,ydiri )}.
3. In order to enable the destination D to reply, S places the reply
Sphinx header SHDRb into the Sphinx payload:
SP = GEN_SPHX_PL_SEND({s
n
f
i
},SHDRb) (4)
4. S creates an initial FS payload PFS = INIT_FS_PAYLOAD(xS).
5. S composes P➊= {CHDR‖ SHDRf ‖ SP ‖PFS} and sends it to
the first node on the forward path nf0 .
Intermediate Node Processing. An intermediate node nfi receiv-
ing a packet P➊ = {CHDR ‖ SHDRf ‖ SP ‖PFS} processes it as
follows:
1. nfi first processes SHDR
f and SP in P➊ according to the Sphinx
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protocol (using PROC_SPHX_PKT). As a result nfi obtains the
processed header and payload (SHDRf ′,SP′) as well as the rout-
ing information Rfi , S’s DH public key y
f
i , and the established
symmetric key s
n
f
i
shared with S. During this processing the
integrity of the CHDR is verified.
2. nfi obtains EXP from CHDR and checks that EXP is not expired.
n
f
i also verifies that R
f
i is valid.
3. To provide forward secrecy, the shared key s
n
f
i
is not used for
the data transmission phase, since s
n
f
i
depends on nfi ’s long-
term DH key. Instead, nfi generates an ephemeral DH key pair
(x′
n
f
i
,y′
n
f
i
) and derives sfi by
s
f
i = (y
f
i )
x′
n
f
i (5)
This is the symmetric key that is included in nfi ’s FS and used
during the data transmission phase.
4. nfi generates its FS FS
f
i by using its local symmetric key SVi
to encrypt sfi , R
f
i , and EXP:
FS
f
i = FS_CREATE(SVi,{s
f
i ‖R
f
i ‖ EXP}) (6)
5. nfi adds its FS
f
i and MD = y
′
n
f
i
into the FS payload PFS .
PFS
′ = ADD_FS(s
n
f
i
,FS
f
i ,y
′
n
f
i
,PFS) (7)
Adding y′
n
f
i
as the meta-data into the FS payload allows S to
later retrieve y′
n
f
i
and derive the symmetric key sfi shared with
n
f
i for the session. The MAC computed using snfi shared be-
tween S and nfi (Line 5 in Algorithm 1) allows S to authenticate
the DH public key y′
n
f
i
.
6. Finally node nfi assembles the processed packet P➊= {CHDR‖
SHDRf
′
‖ SP′ ‖PFS
′} and routes it to the next node according
to the routing information Rfi .
Destination Processing. As the last node on the forward path, D
processes P➊ in the same way as the previous nodes: it processes
the Sphinx packet in P➊ and derives a symmetric key sD shared
with S; it generates a new DH key pair (x′D,y
′
D) and derives a
second shared key s′D; it encrypts per-session state including s
′
D
into FSD and inserts FSD into the FS payload.
After these operations, however, D moves on to create the sec-
ond setup P➋ as follows:
1. D retrieves the Sphinx reply header using the symmetric key
sD:
SHDRb = UNWRAP_SPHX_PL_SEND(sD,SP) (8)
2. D places the FS payload PFS of P➊ into the Sphinx payload
SPb of P➋ (this will allow S to get the FSes {FSfi }):
SPb = GEN_SPHX_PL_RECV(sD,PFS) (9)
Note that sinceD has no knowledge about the keys {sfi } except
for sD ,D learns nothing about the other FSes in the FS payload.
3. D creates a new FS payload PFSb = INIT_FS_PAYLOAD(sD)
to collect the FSes along the backward path.
4. D composes P➋= {CHDR ‖ SHDRb ‖ SPb ‖PFSb} and sends it
to the first node on the backward path, nb0.
The nodes on the backward path process P➋ in the exact same
way nodes on the forward path processed P➊. Finally P➋ reaches
the source S with FSes {FS bi} added to the FS payload.
Post-setup Processing. Once S receives P➋ it extracts all FSes,
i.e., {FSfi } and {FS
b
i}, as follows:
1. S recovers the FS payload for the forward path PFSf from SPb:
PFS
f = UNWRAP_SPHX_PL_RECV({sbi},SP
b) (10)
2. S retrieves the FSes for the nodes on the forward path {FS fi }:
{FS fi }= RETRIEVE_FSES({s
f
i },PFS
f ) (11)
3. S directly extracts from PFSbthe FSes for the nodes on the
backward path {FS bi}:
{FS bi}= RETRIEVE_FSES({s
b
i},PFS
b) (12)
With the FSes for all nodes on both paths,
{
FS
f
i
}
and
{
FS
b
i
}
,
S is ready to start the data transmission phase.
4.4 Data Transmission Phase
Each HORNET data packet contains an anonymous header AHDR
and an onion-encrypted payload O as shown in Figure 1. Figure 2
demonstrates the details of an AHDR. The AHDR allows each inter-
mediate node along the path to retrieve its per-session state in the
form of an FS and process the onion-encrypted data payload. All
processing of data packets in HORNET only involves symmetric-
key cryptography, therefore supporting fast packet processing.
RS
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Figure 2: Format of a HORNET anonymous header with de-
tails of a forwarding segment (FS).
At the beginning of the data transmission phase, S creates two
AHDRs, one for the forward path (AHDRf ) and one for the back-
ward path (AHDRb), by using FSes collected during the setup phase.
AHDRf enables S to send data payloads toD. To enableD to trans-
mit data payloads back, S sends AHDRb as payload in the first data
packet. If this packet is lost, the source would notice from the fact
that no reply is seen from the destination. If this happens the source
simply resends the backward AHDR using a new data packet.
4.4.1 Anonymous Header
Like an FS payload, an AHDR is an onion-encrypted data struc-
ture that contains FSes. It also offers similar guarantees, i.e., se-
crecy and integrity, for the individual FSes it contains, for their
number and for their order. Its functionalities, on the other hand,
are the inverse: while the FS payload allows the source to collect
the FSes added by intermediate nodes, the AHDR enables the source
to re-distribute the FSes back to the nodes for each transmitted data
packet.
Functions. The life cycle of AHDRs involves two functions: GET_FS
and CREATE_AHDR. GET_FS allows each intermediate node to re-
trieve its FS from the input AHDR and compute the AHDR for the
next hop (see Algorithm 3). CREATE_AHDR enables S to create
two AHDRs, AHDRf and AHDRb (see Algorithm 4).
4.4.2 Onion Payload
HORNET data payloads are protected by onion encryption. To
send a data payload to the destination, the source adds a sequence
of encryption layers on top of the data payload, one for each node
on the forward path (including the destination). As the packet is
forwarded, each node removes one layer of encryption, until the
destination removes the last layer and obtains the original plaintext.
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Algorithm 3 Obtain FS from AHDR
1: procedure GET_FS
Input: SV , AHDR
Output: FS, AHDR
2: {FS ‖γ ‖β} ← AHDR
3: s← FS_OPEN(FS ,SV )[0..k]
4: check γ =MAC(hMAC(s);β ‖0c)
5: β′ ← {β ‖0c}⊕PRG2(hPRG2(s))[0...rc]
6: AHDR ← β′
7: end procedure
Algorithm 4 Anonymous header construction
1: procedure CREATE_AHDR
Input: {si}, {FSi}
Output: (FS 0,γ0,β0)
2: φ0 ← ε
3: for i← 1, · · · , l−1 do
4: φi← (φi−1 ‖0c)
⊕
{
PRG2(hPRG2(si−1))[(r−i)c..rc]
}
5: end for
6: βl ←
{
RAND(c(r− l))‖φl−1
}
7: for i← (l−1), . . . ,0 do
8: βi←
{
FS i+1 ‖γi+1 ‖βi+1 [0..c(r−1)−1]
}
⊕PRG2(hPRG2(si))
9: γi←MAC(hMAC(si);FS i ‖βi)
10: end for
11: end procedure
To send a data payload back to the source, the destination adds
only one layer of encryption with its symmetric key shared with
the source. As the packet is forwarded, each node on the backward
path re-encrypts the payload until it reaches the source. With all
the symmetric keys shared with nodes on the backward path, the
source is capable of removing all encryption layers, thus obtaining
the original data payload sent by the destination.
Functions. Processing onion payloads requires two functions: ADD_LAYER
and REMOVE_LAYER.
ADD_LAYER. The function’s full form is:
{O′,IV ′}= ADD_LAYER(s,IV,O) (13)
Given a symmetric key s, an initial vector IV , and an input onion
payload O, ADD_LAYER performs two tasks. First, ADD_LAYER
encrypts O with s and IV :
O′ = ENC(hENC(s);IV ;O) (14)
Then, ADD_LAYER mutates the IV for next node:
IV ′ = PRP(hPRP;IV ) (15)
REMOVE_LAYER. The function is the inverse of ADD_LAYER.
Without going into details, we only list its full form below:
{O′,IV ′}= REMOVE_LAYER(s,IV,O) (16)
4.4.3 Initializing Data Transmission
To start the data transmission session, S generates AHDRf and
AHDRb as follows:
AHDRf = CREATE_AHDR({sfi },{FS
f
i }) (17)
AHDRb = CREATE_AHDR({sbi},{FS
b
i}) (18)
S then sends AHDRb toD as payload of the first data packet (which
uses AHDRf ), as specified in the following section.
4.4.4 Data Transmission Protocol Description
Source Processing. With the forward AHDR (AHDRf ), the source
S can send a data payload P with the following steps:
1. S ensures that the session is not expired by checking that the
current time tcurr < EXP.
2. S creates an initial vector IV . With {sfi }, sD , and IV , S onion
encrypts the data payload P .
{Olf ,IVlf }= ADD_LAYER(sD,IV,P ) (19)
{Oi,IVi}= ADD_LAYER(sD,IVi+1,Oi+1) i← (l
f −1)..0
(20)
3. S places IV0 in the common header CHDR.
4. S sends out the resulting data packet {CHDR,AHDRf ,O0}.
Processing by Intermediate Nodes. Each intermediate node nfi
on the forward path processes a received data packet {CHDR,AHDRf ,O}
with its local secret key SV fi as follows:
1. nfi retrieves its FS FS
f
i from AHDR
f :
{FSfi ,AHDR
f ′}= GET_FS(SV fi ,AHDR
f ) (21)
2. nfi extracts its per-session state, i.e., the symmetric key s
f
i shared
with S, the routing informationRfi , and the session’s expiration
time EXP, by decrypting FS with SV fi (cf. with Equation 1):
{sfi ,R
f
i ,EXP}= PRP
−1(hPRP(SV
f
i );FS
f
i ) (22)
3. nfi checks the session is not expired by verifying that the current
time tcurr < EXP.
4. nfi obtains IV from CHDR and removes one layer of encryption
from the data payload:
{O′,IV ′}= REMOVE_LAYER(sfi ,IV,O) (23)
5. nfi updates the IV field in CHDR with IV ′.
6. nfi sends the resulting packet {CHDR′,AHDRf
′
,O′} to the next
node according to Rfi .
The above procedures show that the intermediate node process-
ing requires only symmetric-cryptography operations.
Destination Processing. D processes incoming data packets as
the intermediate nodes. Additionally, for the first data packet D
retrieves AHDRb from the payload, and stores the {sD ,Rb0,AHDRb}
locally so thatD can retrieve AHDRb when it wishes to send packets
back to S.
Processing for the Backward Path. Sending and processing a
HORNET packet along the backward path is the same as that for
the forward path, with the exception of processing involving the
data payload. Because D does not possess the symmetric keys
that each node on the backward path shares with S, D cannot
onion-encrypt its payload. Accordingly, intermediate nodes use
ADD_LAYER instead of REMOVE_LAYER to process the data pay-
load, and the source node recovers the data by REMOVE_LAYER.
4.5 Nested Anonymous Header Construction
As discussed in Section 3.2, the main difference of the protocols
between sender anonymity and sender-receiver anonymity is that
the latter requires nested AHDRs. We present in detail the process
of composing an AHDR with a nested AHDR in Algorithm 5.
Constructing a new AHDR based on a nested AHDR A has es-
sentially the same procedures as constructing a normal AHDR from
ASes, except for the initialization process and the size of the re-
sulted AHDR. For the AHDR initialization in Line 10 in Algo-
rithm 5, the nested AHDR A is perpended to the random bits gener-
ated. Thus, when the last node ndirl (RP) decrypts the AHDR, A is
revealed to the node. For the size of the resulted AHDR, instead of r
for a normal AHDR, the length of the generated AHDR with a nested
AHDR is 2r, doubling the bandwidth cost incurred by the protocol
headers.
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Algorithm 5 Creating an AHDR with a nested AHDR.
1: procedure CREATE_PADDING_STRING_NESTED
Input: {si}, r
Output: φl−1
2: φ0 ← ε
3: for 0< i < l do
4: φi← (φi−1 ‖0c)⊕
5:
{
PRG0(hPRG0(si−1))[(2r−i)c..2rc]
}
6: end for
7: end procedure
8: procedure CREATE_ANONYMOUS_HEADER_NESTED
Input: {si}, {FSi}, A
Output: (FS 0,γ0,β0)
9: φl−1 ← CREATE_PADDING_STRING_NESTED({si})
10: βl−1 ←
{
{A‖RAND(c(r− l))}
⊕PRG0(hPRG0(sl−1))[0..c(2r−l)−1]
}
‖φl−1
11: γl−1 ←MAC(hMAC(sl−1);FS l−1 ‖βl−1)
12: for i← (l−2), . . . ,0 do
13: βi ←
{
FS i+1 ‖γi+1 ‖βi+1 [0..c(2r−1)−1]
}
⊕PRG0(hPRG0(si))[0..c(2r−l)−1]
14: γi←MAC(hMAC(si);FS i ‖βi)
15: end for
16: end procedure
5. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we first presents formal proofs showing that HOR-
NET satisfies the correctness, security, and integrity properties de-
fined by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [17]. Then, we describes
how HORNET defends against well-known de-anonymization at-
tacks, where an adversary actively or passively attempts to reveal
the sender’s (and/or the receiver’s) network location. We also present
defenses against denial of service attacks.
5.1 Formal Proof of Security for HORNET Data
Transmission Phase
We prove HORNET’s data transmission phase realizes ideal onion
routing functionalities in the Universal Composability (UC) frame-
work [18]. Conceptually, with an ideal onion routing protocol, ad-
versaries have no access to the routing information or the message
within packets except for opaque identifiers that vary across links.
As demonstrated by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [17], to prove
that a protocol conforms to an ideal onion routing model, it is suf-
ficient to show that the protocol provides four properties: correct-
ness, integrity, wrap-resistance, and security.3
5.1.1 Correctness
Proving the correctness property requires that HORNET proto-
col functions correctly in the absence of adversaries. A scrutiny of
protocol description in Section 4 should suffice.
5.1.2 Integrity
To prove the integrity property, we need to prove that an adver-
sary cannot forge a message that can traverse more than N uncom-
promised nodes, where Q is a fixed upper bound for HORNET.
Equivalently, we demonstrate that the adversary, with significantly
less than 2k computation, can only produce a requisite message
with a negligible probability. In our proof, we choose Q = r+1.
Suppose that an adversary can constructs an HORNET AHDR
(FS0,γ0,β0) that can succeed in traversing r+1 honest nodes n0,
3See definitions by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [17].
n2, · · · , nr , without knowing secrets SV0, · · · , SVr . According to
Algorithm 4, FSr, βr , and γr satisfy:
γr =MAC(hMAC(PRP
−1(hPRP (SVr);FSr)[0..c]);βr) (24)
For convenience, for i ≤ j ≤ r− 1, we introduce the following
notations:
φ(SV,FS) = PRP−1 (hPRP (SV ) ;FS) (25)
ρ(SV,FS) = PRG(hPRG (φ(SV,FS))) (26)
ρi = ρ(SVi,FS
∗
i ) (27)
ρFSi = {ρi}[c(r−1−i)..c(r−1−i)+lFS−1] (28)
ρ
γ
i = {ρi}[c(r−1−i)+lFS ..c(r−i)−1] (29)
ρ
β
i = {ρi}[0..c(i+1)−1] ||0
c(r−1−i) (30)
ρci,j = {ρi}[jc..(j+1)c−1] (31)
where FS∗i are defined recursively as follows:
FS∗0 = FS0 (32)
FS∗i = FSi⊕
i−1⊕
j=0
{ρi}[c(j+i−1)..c(j+i−1)+lFS−1] (33)
We observe that FS∗i is a function of {FSj | ∀0 ≤ j ≤ i} and
{SVj | ∀0 ≤ j ≤ i− 1}. Accordingly, ρFSi , ρ
γ
i , and ρ
β
i are all
functions of {FSj | ∀0≤ j ≤ i} and {SVj | ∀0 ≤ j ≤ i−1}.
With a detailed inspection into Algorithm 4, we can express
FSr, βr , and γr:
FSr =
r−1⊕
i=0
ρFSi (34)
γr =
r−1⊕
i=0
ρ
γ
i (35)
βr =
r−1⊕
i=0
ρ
β
i (36)
(37)
With Equation 34, 35, 36 and 24, we can prove the following
lemma:
LEMMA 1. With less than 2k work, an adversary can only dis-
tinguishMAC(hMAC (φ(SVr,FSr)[0..c]);βr) from a random or-
acle with negligible probability.
Proof. (Sketch) We will show that an adversary could not find two
sets of
(SV0, · · · ,SVr,FS0 · · · ,FSr−1) 6= (SV
′
0 , · · · ,SV
′
r
,FS′0 · · · ,FSr′−1)
that leads to the same value ofMAC(hMAC (φ(SVr,FSr)[0..c]);βr)
with significant less than 2k work.
Assume that the adversary, with much less than 2k work, finds
two sets,
(SV0, · · · ,SVr,FS0 · · · ,FSr) 6= (SV
′
0 , · · · ,SV
′
r ,FS
′
0 · · · ,FS
′
r)
that results in the same value of
MAC(hMAC (φ(SVr,FSr)[0..c]);βr)
We will show the assumption leads to an contradiction.
Because MAC is a random oracle, the only way for an attacker
to distinguish the target function from a random oracle with much
less than 2k work is to ensure
φ(SVr,FSr)[0..c] = φ(SV
′
r,FS
′
r)[0..c]
and βr = β′r . Because PRP is a pseudo-random permutation and
hPRP is collision resistant, we have SVr = SV ′r .
Note that the last c bits of βr and β′r are ρcr−1,r−1 and ρcr−1,r−1
′
respectively. Therefore, we have ρcr−1,r−1 = ρcr−1,r−1
′
. According
to Equation 31, because PRG is a pseudo-random generator, we
have SVr−1 = SVr−1 and FS∗r−1 = FS∗r−1
′
. Hence, ρcr−1,j =
ρcr−1,j
′
, ∀0≤ j ≤ r−1.
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A careful calculation shows that the c bits before the last c bits
in βr and β′r are ρcr−2,r−2⊕ρcr−1,r−2 and ρcr−2,r−2
′⊕ρcr−1,r−2
′
.
Similarly, we have SVr−2 = SVr−2′ and FS∗r−2 = FS∗r−2
′
.
Continuing the logic in the way above, we finally have SVi =
SV ′i and FS∗i = FS∗i
′
, ∀0 ≤ i ≤ r− 1. However, given Equa-
tion 33, SVi = SV ′i , and FS∗0 = FS∗0
′
, we have FSi = FS′i,
∀0 ≤ i≤ r−1. That says,
(SV0, · · · ,SVr,FS0 · · · ,FSr−1) = (SV
′
0 , · · · ,SV
′
r
,FS′0 · · · ,FSr′−1)
. Therefore, we obtain a contradiction.
We can substitute Equation 34, 35, and 36 into Equation 24, and
rewrite the equation into:
ρ
γ
0 =MAC(hMAC (φ(SVr,FSr)[0..c]);βr)⊕
r−1⊕
i=1
ρ
γ
i (38)
Because MAC is not used in ργi , the right side of Equation 38 is a
random oracle with respect to SVi and FSi, ∀0≤ i≤ r−1.
We can further simplify the notation by denoting ργ0 as f0(SV0,FS0)
and the right side of Equation 38 as
f1(FS0, · · · ,FSr−1,SV0, · · · ,SVr−1)
. Both f0 and f1 are random oracle with range {0,1}k . As a result,
by creating a AHDR traversing r+ 1 honest nodes, the adversary
equivalently finds a solution to
f0(SV0,FS0) = f1(FS0, · · · ,FSr−1,SV0, · · · ,SVr−1)
which obviously can only be solved with negligible probability
with significantly less than 2k work. That says, with much less
than 2k work, the adversary can only generate a packet that tra-
verse r+1 hops with negligible probability.
5.1.3 Wrap-resistance
To prove the wrap-resistance property, we show that given a data
packet (FS,γ,β,P ), an adversary, with significant less than 2k
work, cannot generate a message (FS′,γ′,β′,P ) so that process-
ing (FS′,γ′,β′,P ) on an uncompromised node yields data packet
(FS,γ,β,P ).
To succeed, it is necessary thatïijŽ
β⊕{β′c..cr−1||0c}= ρ(SV ′,FS′) (39)
Consider the last c bits of the left side of Equation 39, we have:
β[c(r−1)..cr−1] = ρ(SV
′,FS′)[c(r−1)..cr−1] (40)
Because PRG, PRP , hPRG, and hPRP are all random oracles,
an adversary could generate FS′ and SV ′ that satisfy Equation 40
only with negligible probability if the adversary performs much
less than 2k work.
5.1.4 Security
In order to demonstrate the security property, we need to prove
that an adversary with controls over all nodes on a path except one
node N , cannot distinguish among data packets entering N . The
adversary is able to select paths for the packets traversing N and
payloads of the packets. The adversary can also observe packets en-
tering and leaving node N except for packets whose headers match
the challenge packets.
We construct the following game G. The adversary picks two
paths (n0,n1, · · · ,nν−1) 0 < ν ≤ r and (n′0,n′1, · · · ,n′ν ′−1) 0 ≤
ν ′ ≤ r, where ni = n′i ∀0 ≤ i ≤ j and nj = n′j = N . Note that
the nodes after N in both paths are not necessarily the same set
of nodes, and the lengths of the paths can also be different. The
adversary chooses the public/private key pairs and SVi(SV ′i ) for
all nodes except N and can arbitrarily select payload M .
The challenger picks randomly a bit b and proceeds in one of the
following two ways:
b = 0: The challenger creates an AHDR (FS0,γ0,β0) through
the HORNET setup phase using the path (n0,n1, · · · ,nν−1) and
uses it to construct a data packet with onion encrypted payload Me
from M . The challenger outputs (FS0,γ0,β0,Me), which could
be sent to n0.
b = 1: The challenger creates an AHDR (FS0,γ0,β0) using the
alternative path (n′0,n′1, · · · ,n′ν−1) instead and outputs
(FS0,γ0,β0,Me), which could be sent to n′0.
Given the output (FS0,γ0,β0), the adversary’s goal is to deter-
mine b. The adversary can also input any messages (FS′,γ′,β′,Me ′)
to the honest node N and observes the output messages as long as
(FS′,γ′,β′) 6= (FSj ,γj ,βj).
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We define the adversary’s advantage as the difference between 12
and the probability that the adversary succeeds. We will show that
the adversary’s advantage is negligible. That says, the adversary
has no better chance to determine b than random guessing.
Proof. (Sketch) We adopt the method of hybrid games. First, we
construct a modified gameG1 with exactly the same definition, ex-
cept that we require j = 0. An adversary who can win G can thus
immediately win G1. On the other hand, because the adversary
controls nodes (n0, · · · ,nj−1) ((n′0, · · · ,n′j−1)) and can thus emu-
late their processing, the adversary can also win game G if he/she
can win game G1. Therefore, the adversary can win game G if and
only if the adversary can win game G1.
We create a second game G2, which is the same as G1 except
that FS0, β0, and γ0 are all randomly generated from their corre-
sponding domains. If the adversary can distinguish G2 from G1,
we have:
1. The adversary can distinguish
FS0 = PRP (hPRP (SV0);R0||s0)
from randomness. Then it must be that the adversary is able
to tell the output of a pseudo-random permutation with a ran-
dom key (hPRP (SV0)) from random bits. The probability
of success for the adversary is negligible.
2. The adversary can distinguish
β0 = PRG(hPRG(SV0))⊕{FS1||γ1||β1}
from randomness. Then it must be the adversary is able to
distinguish the output of a secure pseudo-random number
generator with a random key (hPRG(SV0)) from random-
ness. The probability that the adversary succeeds is negligi-
ble.
3. The adversary can distinguish
γ0 =MAC(hMAC(SV0);β0)
from randomness. Then it must be the adversary is able to
distinguish the output ofMAC with a random key hMAC(SV0)
from randomness. Under our random oracle assumption for
MAC, the probability of success is negligible.
Therefore, the adversary cannot distinguish G2 from G1.
At last, because in G2, (FS0,γ0,β0) are all random, the adver-
sary’s advantage is 0. Moreover, in our chain of game G→G1 →
G2, the adversary can only distinguish a game from its previous
game with negligible probability. As a result, the adversary’s ad-
vantage in game G is negligible.
5.2 Passive De-anonymization
Session linkage. Each session is established independently from
every other session, based on fresh, randomly generated keys. Ses-
sions are in particular not related to any long term secret or identi-
fier of the host that creates them. Thus, two sessions from the same
host are unlinkable, i.e., they are cryptographically indistinguish-
able from sessions of two different hosts.
Forward/backward flow correlation. The forward and backward
headers are derived from distinct cryptographic keys and therefore
4We follow the definition of security property in [17] and only care
about header uniqueness.
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cannot be linked. Only the destination is able to correlate forward
and backward traffic, and could exploit this to discover the round-
trip time (RTT) between the source and itself, which is common to
all low-latency anonymity systems. Sources, willing to thwart such
RTT-based attacks from malicious destinations, could introduce a
random response delay for additional protection.
Packet correlation. HORNET obfuscates packets at each hop to
prevent an adversary observing two points on a path from linking
packets between those two points using packets’ bit-patterns. Be-
sides the use of onion encryption, we also enforce this obfusca-
tion by padding header and payload to a fixed length, thwarting
packet-size-based correlation.5 While this does not prevent the ad-
versary from discovering that the same flow is passing his observa-
tion points using traffic analysis, it makes this process non-trivial,
and allows upper layer protocols to take additional measures to
hide traffic patterns. The hop-by-hop encryption of the payload
also hides the contents of the communication in transit, protect-
ing against information leaked by upper layer protocols that can be
used to correlate packets.
Flow-dynamics-based end-to-end correlation. In general it is
difficult even for high latency mix networks to resist such powerful
adversaries [34]. Low-latency anonymity systems are particularly
prone to these types of attacks [43, 30]. HORNET cannot protect
against them, but as mentioned above, the use of packet obfuscation
makes these attacks more expensive and allows for potential addi-
tional measures to be taken (e.g., padding), either by upper layer
protocols or by extensions of HORNET. Mass surveillance based
on end-to-end confirmation attacks requires an adversary to mon-
itor a large fraction of the nodes of the network and to store and
process all intercepted traffic, so it falls outside our attacker model.
5.3 Active De-anonymization
Session state modification. The state of each node is included in
an encrypted FS. During the session setup, the FSes are inserted
into the FS payload, which allows the source to check the integrity
of these FSes during the setup phase. When the FSes are carried
in the AHDR, they are integrity-protected as well thanks to per-hop
MACs computed by the source. This second case needs clarifi-
cation, however, since it involves a particular construction. Each
MAC protecting an FS is computed using a key contained in that
FS. This construction is secure because every FS is encrypted us-
ing a PRP keyed with a secret value known only to the node that
created the FS: if the FS is modified, the authentication key that
the node obtains after decryption is a new pseudo-random key that
the adversary cannot control. Thus, the probability of the adversary
being able to forge a valid MAC is still negligible.
Path modification. Both HORNET data structures that hold paths,
i.e., the FS payloads in the setup phase and the AHDRs, use chained
per-hop MACs to protect path integrity and thwart attacks like in-
serting new nodes, changing the order of nodes, and splicing two
paths. The source can check such chained per-hop MACs to detect
the modifications in the FS payload before using the modified FS
payload to construct AHDRs, and similarly intermediate nodes can
detect modifications to AHDRs and drop the altered packets.
Replay attacks. Replaying packets can facilitate some types of
confirmation attacks. For example, an adversary can replay pack-
ets with a pre-selected pattern, and have a colluding node iden-
tify those packets downstream. HORNET offers replay protection
through session expiration. Replayed packets whose sessions have
expired are immediately dropped. Replay of packets whose ses-
5An alternative for a more optimized bandwidth usage would be to
allow two or three different payload sizes, at a cost of decreased
anonymity.
sions are not yet expired is possible, but the risk of misbehaving
nodes being detected6 might deter an adversary from using replays
to conduct mass surveillance.
Payload tagging or tampering. HORNET does not use per-hop
MACs on the payload of data packets for efficiency and because
the destination would not be able to compute such MACs. The
lack of integrity protection allows an adversary to tag payloads.
Admittedly, by using tagging in conjunction with replay attacks,
the adversary is able to improve the effectiveness of confirmation
attacks. However, the end-to-end MACs protect the integrity of the
data, making such attacks (at a large scale) detectable.
5.4 Denial-of-Service (DoS) Resilience
Computational DoS. The use of asymmetric cryptography in the
setup phase makes HORNET vulnerable to computational DoS at-
tacks, where adversaries can attempt to deplete a victim node’s
computation capability by initiating a large number of sessions through
this node. To mitigate this attack, HORNET nodes should rate-limit
the number of session setup packets that are processed per neigh-
bor.
State-based DoS. HORNET is not vulnerable to attacks where ad-
versaries maintain a large number of active sessions through a vic-
tim node. One of HORNET’s key features is that all state is carried
within packets, thus no per-session memory is required on nodes or
rendezvous points.
5.5 Topology-based Analysis
Unlike onion routing protocols that use global re-routing through
overlay networks (e.g., Tor [23] and I2P [47]), HORNET uses short
paths created by the underlying network architecture to reduce la-
tency, and is therefore bound by the network’s physical intercon-
nection and ISP relationships. This is an unavoidable constraint for
onion routing protocols built into the network layer [29, 42]. Thus,
knowledge of the network topology enables an adversary to reduce
the number of possible sources (and destinations) of a flow by only
looking at the previous (and next) hop of that flow. For example,
in Figure 3(a), assume that AS0 is controlled by a passive adver-
sary. The topology indicates that any packet received from AS1
must have originated from a source located at one of {AS1, AS2,
AS3, AS4, AS5}.
We evaluate the information leakage due to the above topology
constraints in the scenario where a single AS is compromised. We
derive AS-level paths from iPlane trace-route data [7]7, and use
AS-level topology data from CAIDA [33]. For each AS on each
path we assume that the AS is compromised and receives packets
from a victim end host through that path. We compute the end
host’s anonymity set size that the adversary learns according to the
topology. Similar to Hsiao et al. [29], we use the number of IPv4
addresses to estimate the size of the anonymity set of end hosts.
Figure 3(b) plots the CDF of the anonymity set size for different
distances (in number of AS hops) between the adversary and the
victim end host. For adversarial ASes that are 4 hops away, the
anonymity set size is larger than 231 in 90% of the cases. Note that
the maximum anonymity set size is 232 in our analysis, because we
consider only IPv4 addresses.
Implications of path knowledge. Knowledge about the path, in-
cluding the total length of the path and an adversarial node’s po-
sition on the path, significantly downgrades the anonymity of end
hosts. Considering again Figure 3(a), if the adversary controlling
AS0 sees a packet incoming from AS1 and knows that it is 4 hops
6Volunteers and organizations might monitor the network, and hon-
est ASes might control their own nodes as part of an IDS.
7Traceroute data was generated on October 12, 2014
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Figure 3: a) An example AS-level topology with an adversarial AS (AS0); b) CDF of anonymity-set size when a position-agnostic
AS on path is adversarial. “Hops” indicates the number of ASes between the adversarial AS and the victim end host. c) CDF of
anonymity-set size when an adversarial AS knows its own position on the path.
away from the source host, he learns that the source host is in AS4.
Compared with the previous case, we see that the anonymity set
size is strongly reduced.
We quantify additional information leakage in the same setting
as the previous evaluation. Figure 3(c) represents the CDFs of the
anonymity set sizes of end hosts according to the distance to the
compromised AS. The anonymity set sizes are below 228 in 90%
of the cases when the adversarial ASes are 4 hops away, with an
average size of 223. This average size decreases to 217 for the cases
where the adversarial ASes are 7 hops away from the target hosts.
Previous path-based anonymity systems designed for the net-
work layer either fail to hide knowledge about the path [42] or only
partially obscure the information [29]. In comparison, HORNET
protects both the path length and the position of each node on the
path, which significantly increases the anonymity-set size of the
end hosts, as our analysis in this section showed.
6. EVALUATION
We implemented the HORNET router logic in an Intel software
router using the Data Plane Development Kit (DPDK) [4]. To our
knowledge, no other anonymity protocols have been implemented
in a router SDK. We also implemented the HORNET client in
Python. Furthermore, we assembled a custom crypto library based
on the Intel AESNI crypto library [6], the curve25519-donna li-
brary [3], and the PolarSSL libraries [9]. For comparison, we im-
plemented the data forwarding logic from LAP, Dovetail, and L3
Tor8 and Sphinx using DPDK and our crypto library. We use IP
forwarding in DPDK as our performance baseline.
Our testbed contains an Intel software router connected to a Spirent
TestCenter packet generator and analyzer [11]. The software router
runs DPDK 1.7.1 and is equipped with an Intel Xeon E5-2680
processor (2.70 GHz, 2 sockets, 16 logical cores/socket), 64 GB
DRAM, and 3 Intel 82599ES 40 Gb/s network cards (each with 4
10 Gb/s ports). We configured DPDK to use 2 receiving queues for
each port with 1 adjacent logical core per queue.
6.1 Data Forwarding Performance
Forwarding latency. We measure the CPU cycles consumed to
forward a data packet in all schemes. Figure 5(a) shows the aver-
age latency (with error bars) to process and forward a single data
packet in all schemes when payload sizes vary. We observe that
data forwarding in Sphinx is 3 orders of magnitude slower than that
8For fair comparison, we only implement payload encryp-
tion/decryption. We do not implemented SSL/TLS or L4 transport
control logic.
Scheme Header Length Sample Length (Bytes)
LAP 12+2s ·r 236
Dovetail 12+s ·r 124
Sphinx 32+(2r+2)s 296
Tor 3+11 ·r 80
HORNET 8+3r ·s 344
Table 1: Comparison between the length of different packet
header formats in bytes. s is the length of symmetric elements
and r is the maximum AS path length. For the sample length,
we select s= 16 Bytes and r= 7. Analysis of iPlane paths shows
that more than 99% of all paths have less than 7 AS hops.
of HORNET, L3 Tor, LAP, and Dovetail because Sphinx requires
per-packet asymmetric crypto operations. We further observe that
HORNET, even with onion encryption/decryption over the entire
payload and extensive header manipulation, is only 5% slower than
LAP and Dovetail for small payload (64 bytes). For large payloads
(1200 bytes9), HORNET is 71% slower (about 400 nanoseconds
slower per packet when using a single core) than LAP and Dove-
tail. However, the additional processing overhead enables stronger
security guarantees.
Header overhead. As a result of carrying anonymous session state
(specifically cryptographic keys) within packet headers, HORNET
headers are larger than Sphinx, L3 Tor, LAP, and Dovetail headers
(see Table 1). While larger headers reduce net throughput (i.e.,
goodput), this tradeoff appears acceptable: compared to L3 Tor,
no state is required at relay nodes, enabling scalability; compared
to Sphinx, data processing speed is higher; compared to LAP and
Dovetail, HORNET provides stronger security properties.
Throughput. To compare the throughput of data forwarding, we
measure the throughput of all schemes on a single CPU core on a
10 Gb/s link with different payload sizes. The result is shown in
Figure 6.1. We observe that all schemes except Sphinx can satu-
rate the 10Gb/s link when the payload size is larger than 512 Bytes.
When payload size is smaller than 256 Bytes, HORNET’s through-
put is 20% - 30% smaller than LAP and Dovetail, whose through-
put, in turn are 25% smaller than IP forwarding. Note, Tor’s small
throughput at small payload sizes is mainly a reflection of its small
per-hop header size, as later proved in Figure 5(b). In comparison,
Sphinx can only achieve 0.05Gb at its maximum when the packet
9Because LAP, Dovetail, and HORNET all have large packet head-
ers of 300+ bytes, we limit the largest payload in our experiments
to be 1200 bytes.
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size is 1500 Bytes because of its expensive data forwarding.
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Figure 4: Data forwarding throughput on 10 Gb/s link
Goodput. We further compare all the schemes by goodput, which
excludes the header overhead from total throughput. Goodput is a
comprehensive metric to evaluate both the packet processing speed
and protocol overhead. For example, a scheme where headers take
up a large proportion of packets yields only low goodput. On the
other hand, a scheme with low processing speed also results in poor
goodput.
Figure 5(b) and Figure 5(c) demonstrate the goodput of all schemes
on a 10Gb/s link when varying the number of hops, with 40-byte
and 1024-byte payloads, respectively. We observe that Sphinx’s
goodput is the lowest in both cases because of its large packet head-
ers and slow asymmetric-crypto-based packet processing.
When the payload size is small, the goodput of all protocols
remains stable. This is due to the fact that no scheme can sat-
urate the link, and accordingly the goodput differences between
the three schemes mainly reflect the different processing latencies
among them. Consequently, L3 Tor’s and HORNET’s goodput is
32% less than that of LAP and Dovetail. On the other hand, when
the payload size is large, all schemes except Sphinx can saturate
the 10Gb/s link. HORNET can reach 93% of LAP and Dovetail’s
goodput while providing stronger security guarantees.
6.2 Max Throughput on a Single Router
To investigate how our implementation scales with respect to the
number of CPU cores, we use all 12 ports on the software router,
generating HORNET data packets at 10 Gb/s on each port. Each
packet contains a 7 AS-hop header and a payload of 512 bytes, and
is distributed uniformly among the working ports. We monitor the
aggregate throughput on the software router.
The maximal aggregate throughput of HORNET forwarding in
our software router is 93.5 Gb/s, which is comparable to today’s
switching capacity of a commercial edge router [2]. When the
number of cores is less than 5, our HORNET implementation can
achieve full line rate (i.e., 10 Gb/s per port). As the number of cores
increases to 5 and above, each additional port, with the two logical
cores binded to the port, adds an extra 6.8Gb/s.
6.3 Session-Setup Performance
We evaluate the latency introduced by processing setup packets
on each border router. Similar to measuring the latency of data for-
warding, we also instrument the code to measure CPU cycles con-
sumed to process packets in the session-setup phase. Table 2 lists
the average per-node latency for processing the two setup packets
in HORNET’s session-setup phase. Due to a Diffie-Hellman key
exchange, processing the two setup packets in the session-setup
phase increases processing latency (by about 240µs) compared to
data packet processing. However, HORNET must only incur in this
latency once per session.
Packet Latency (K cycles) Latency (µs)
P➊ 661.95 ± 30.35 245.17 ± 11.24
P➋ 655.85 ± 34.03 242.91 ± 12.60
Table 2: Per-node latency to process session-setup packets with
standard errors.
6.4 Network Evaluation
Distribution of AS-level path length.. The bandwidth overhead of
a HORNET packet depends on the number of ASes traversed by the
packet. Figure 6 demonstrates the CDF of AS-level path lengths of
the paths extracted from our data source. We observe that 99% of
the paths have a path length smaller than 7, and the mean AS-level
path length is 4.2. Thus, to achieve 128 bits of security, 48 bytes
per AS hop are required, leading to an average overhead of 201.6
bytes.
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Figure 6: CDF of AS-level path length.
Non-scalability of a stateful design. We evaluate the memory
capacity needed to maintain state required by a stateful design to
support Internet-scale anonymous communication. We consider
the design of Tor, one of the most popular onion routing systems
today [23], and assume that each Tor node (onion router or OR)
would correspond to an autonomous system (AS), as proposed by
Liu et al. [32]. Analyzing the CAIDA Internet Traces [1], we found
that a 10 GbE backbone link handles about 1M new flows every
minute under normal operating conditions. Since the largest inter-
AS links today have up to ten times that capacity (100 Gbps)10, this
means that at the core of the network there are edge routers of ASes
that handle about 10M new flows per minute.
If we assume that half of these flows would use a Tor circuit,
because of the default lifetime of circuits of 10 minutes11 we ob-
tain that ORs on such edge routers would need to store state for
10E.g., see www.seattleix.net/participants.htm.
11We actually measured the number of flows taking this lifetime into
account, in particular we expired flows only if no packets where
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Figure 5: a) Per-node data forwarding latency on a 10 Gbps link; b)Data forwarding goodput on a 10 Gbps link for small packets (40
Bytes payload); c) Data forwarding goodput large packets (1024 Bytes payload). For a), lower is better; for others, higher is better.
approximatively 50M circuits at all times. Since Tor stores at least
376 bytes per circuit, this translates to almost 20 GB of memory.
This might still be acceptable for high-end devices, but there are
a number of additional factors that make keeping state unfeasible,
even for ASes handling less traffic:
• The growing number of user on the Internet and the increas-
ing number of devices per user result in an increasing number
of traffic flows;
• The state for each circuit would actually be larger, as for ac-
tive circuits the ORs need to store the packets being trans-
mitted until they are acknowledged by the next hop;
• A DDoS attack could force an OR to store much more state
by opening a large number of new circuits through that OR.
7. DISCUSSION
7.1 Retrieving Paths Anonymously in FIAs
HORNET assumes that the source host can obtain a forward path
and a backward path to an intended destination host anonymously
in FIAs. We briefly discuss how a source host using HORNET can
retrieve such two paths in NIRA, SCION and Pathlet.
NIRA and SCION hosts rely on path servers to retrieve paths. In
both architectures, each destination node registers its path to/from
the network “core” on a centralized path server. A source only
needs to anonymously fetch the information registered by the desti-
nation to form forward and backward paths, which could be done in
two ways. As a first method, the source can obtain the paths to/from
the path servers from resolver configuration or local services simi-
lar to DHCP and establish an anonymous HORNET session to the
servers. Once the HORNET session is created, the source can pro-
ceed to anonymously request a path to the destination. Alterna-
tively, the source can leverage a PIR scheme to retrieve the path
anonymously from the path server.
In Pathlet routing, the situation is different because the routing
information is disseminated through a path vector protocol. The
source can keep a local database of pathlets and simply query the
database locally for the pathlets to a certain destination.
7.2 Composability with other protocols
HORNET operates at the network layer. As such, upper-layer
anonymity protocols may be used in conjunction with HORNET to
provide stronger anonymity guarantees. For example, to help mit-
igate concerns of topology-based attacks (as seen in Section 5.5),
seen on them for over 10 minutes. Also note that in our setting it
would not be possible to have multiple streams per circuit, unless
the destinations those streams are in the same AS.
a single hop proxy or virtual private network (VPN) could be used
to increase the size of the anonymity sets of end hosts. Similar
solutions could also protect against upper-layer de-anonymization
attacks, in particular fingerprinting attacks on the transport proto-
col [44].
At lower layers, HORNET is also compatible with link-layer
protection such as link-level encryption. The role of link-level en-
cryption in HORNET is comparable to SSL/TLS in Tor. Link en-
cryption prevents an adversary eavesdropping on a link from being
able to distinguish individual sessions from each other, therefore
making confirmation attacks much harder for this type of adver-
sary.
7.3 Targeted confirmation attacks
When an adversary controls more than one node on a path, it
can launch confirmation attacks by leveraging flow-dynamics anal-
ysis, timing, and packet tagging, all of which can be further assisted
by replay attacks. HORNET, like other low-latency onion routing
schemes [23], cannot prevent such confirmation attacks targeting
individual users. However, HORNET raises the bar of deploying
such attacks for secretive mass surveillance: the adversary must
be capable of controlling a significant percentage of ISPs often re-
siding in multiple geopolitical boundaries, not to mention keeping
such massive activity confidential.
8. RELATED WORK
Anonymity system using overlays. The study of anonymous com-
munication began with Chaum’s proposal for mix relays [19]. A
number of message-based mix systems have been proposed and
deployed since [28, 36, 20, 21]. These systems can withstand an
active adversary and a large fraction of compromised relays, but
rely on expensive asymmetric primitives, and message batching
and mixing. Thus, they suffer from large computational overhead
and high latency.
Onion routing systems [41, 23] were proposed to efficiently sup-
port interactive web traffic. Onion routing systems are vulnerable
against end-to-end correlation attacks [31], and may fail to provide
unlinkability when two routers on the path are compromised [27,
30]. While these systems are generally intended as overlays, some
proposals [14, 15] are closer to the network layer in that they use
UDP (instead of TCP [23]) between pairs of onion routers. HOR-
NET distinguishes itself from all of these systems in two ways: it
does not store per-connection state on the nodes, and it requires
only a single round trip to establish an anonymous path.
Anonymity systems in FIAs. Hsiao et al. [29] explored the de-
sign space of efficient anonymous systems with a relaxed adversary
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model. In their scheme, LAP, the adversary can compromise only
a single node, and the first hop must always be honest. Sankey
and Wright proposed Dovetail [42] (based on Pathlets [26] and
SCION [48]) which has the same attacker model as LAP, except
it allows the first hop to be compromised. Compared to HORNET
and to onion routing, LAP and Dovetail do not offer protection to
the payload, and they allow nodes to learn their position on the
path.
The research community has also explored applying onion rout-
ing to FIAs. Liu et al. [32] proposed Tor instead of IP as an FIA
that regards anonymity as the principal requirement for the network
architecture. However, details on how to scale Tor’s current design
(requiring per-circuit state) to Internet scale were not addressed.
DiBenedetto et al. [22] proposed ANDaNA, to enable onion rout-
ing in Named Data Networking (NDN). NDN focuses on content
delivery and thus inherently different from the FIAs we considered.
9. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we address the question of “what minimal mech-
anism can we use to frustrate pervasive surveillance [24]?” and
study the design of a high-speed anonymity system supported by
the network architecture. We propose HORNET, a scalable and
high-speed onion routing scheme for future Internet architectures.
HORNET nodes can process anonymous traffic at over 93 Gb/s
and require no per-flow state, paving the path for Internet-scale
anonymity. Our experiments show that small trade-offs in packet
header size greatly benefit security, while retaining high perfor-
mance.
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